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U.C.C. FILINGS: CHANGING
CIRCUMSTANCES CAN MAKE A
RIGHT FILING WRONG. BUT
CAN THEY MAKE A
WRONG FILING RIGHT?
DAVID FRISCH*

A secured party who wishes to perfect an Article 9 1 security interest by
filing must file a proper financing statement in the correct office.2 If a
security interest is perfected, changing circumstances, such as a lapse in
time after a change in the location of the collateral, may transform the
perfected security interest into an unperfected one. 3 Consequently, the
security interest, much to the dismay of the secured party, will be subject to all the deficiencies of an unperfected interest. But, under the
Uniform Commercial Code, can the converse be true? That is, for example, can an unperfected security interest, unperfected because the
financing statement was initially filed in the wrong location, be perfected when circumstances change so that the filing is consequently
made in the correct office (j.e., the office in which future filings would
be made).
This Article argues that filings, initially ineffective, should be
deemed effective and hence should perfect the security interest if a
• Associate Professor of Law, Delaware Law School. J.D. 1975, University of Miami;
LL.M. 1980, Yale University. The author expresses his sincere appreciation to Professor Fairfax
Leary, Jr. for his suggestions in the preparation of this Article. The author also wishes to acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of James Holzinger, a member of the class of 1983, Delaware Law School.
I. U.C.C. Article 9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.]. All references and citations in this
Article to the text and comments of the U.C.C. are to the 1978 version unless otherwise indicated.
2. A security interest may also be perfected by possession. U.C.C. § 9-305. Certain types of
security interests can be temporarily or permanently perfected without filing or possession. U.C.C
§§ 9-302(1), -304(4), (5), -321(2).
3. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-103 (l)(d) (change in location of collateral if action required by Part
3 of Article 9); § 9-401 (Alternative Subsec. (3)) (intercounty change in the location of the collateral, debtor's residence, or debtor's place of business).
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change in circumstances would make the original filing effective if it
were filed after the change.
I. BACKGROUND: FILING LOCATION AND CONTENT

The correct office for filing purposes, though of critical importance
to the secured party,4 can be difficult to determine. 5 The choice depends on the U.C.C.'s response to two questions: (1) in which state
must a :financing statement be filed, and (2) where in the proper state
must a filing be made. The answer to the first question is found in the
conflict-of-laws rules of U.C.C. section 9-103. 6 This section is divided
into six subsections, each of which contains the conflict-of-laws provision for a particular kind of collateral.7 The primary rule, however, is
4. If the secured party files in the wrong place or not in all the places required by the
U.C.C., the security interest will remain unperfected. The general rule is: "Except as otherwise
provided by this Act a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties,
against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201. Despite the general
rule, an unperfected security interest is unenforceable against most third parties because the
number of exceptions to the general rule have in fact gobbled up the rule. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9301 (list of persons who take priority over an unperfected security interest);§ 9-312(5) (conflicting
unperfected security interests are given priority based on time of attachment).
Although an improper filing can never perfect a security interest, it can be effective against
certain third parties because "[a] filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not in
all of the places required . . . is . . . effective with regard to any collateral . . . covered by the
financing statement against any person who has knowledge of the contents of such financing statement." U.C.C. § 9-401(2). For cases interpreting this provision, see In re Davidoff, 35 I F. Supp.
440, 443-44 (D.N.Y. 1972); In re Komfo Prods. Corp., 247 F. Supp. 229, 239 (D. Pa. 1965); In re
King Furniture City, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 453, 457 (D. Ark. 1965); In re Babcock Box Co., 200 F.
Supp. 80, 81 (D. Mass. 1961); In re Luckenbill, 156 F. Supp. 129, 131-32 (D. Pa. 1957); Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. Bank of Wiggins, 358 So. 2d 714, 717 (Miss. 1978); In re Enark Indus., Inc., 86
Misc. 2d 985, 987 (1976).
S. A rough estimate of the number of cases involving an allegedly misfiled financing statement reported in U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) exceeds 200.
6. The 1972 revision of the U.C.C. substantially modified§ 9-103 and deleted the choice of
law clause of§ 9-102. For discussions of the conflict-of-laws rules under U.C.C. Article 9 (1962)
[hereinajler cited as the Old Code], see generally Vernon, Recorded Chai/el Security Interests in the
Cot!/fict ofLaws, 41 IOWA L. REV. 346, 376-79 (1962) (discussing the ambiguities of the Old Code);
Weintraub, Choice of Law in Secured Personal Property Transactions: The Impact of Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 MICH. L. REV. 683, 691-718 (1970) (discussing applications of
Old Code and advocating improvements in the Old Code).
7. The six categories of collateral are: (1) documents, instruments, and ordinary goods;
(2) goods covered by a certificate of title; (3) accounts, general intangibles, and mobile goods;
(4) chattel paper; (S) minerals; and (6) uncertificated securities. U.C.C. § 9-103. For discussions of
the conflict-of-laws rules under the U.C.C., see generally Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86
HARV. L. REV. 477, 529-58 (1973) (presenting the theory behind the current Article 9 conflict-oflaw rules and expressing doubt as to the efficacy of the last event test); Kripke, The "Last Event"
Test for Perfection of Security Interests Under Article 9 of the Unfform Commercial Code, SO
N.Y.U. L. REV. 47, 47-75 (1975) (responding to contemporary criticism of the primary conflict-oflaws rule and illustrating the proper application of the rule); Petit, Choice of Law Under Article
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the "last event" test: 8
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, perfection and the
effect of perfection or non-perfection of a security interest in collateral are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is
when the last event occurs on which is based the assertion that the
security interest is perfected or unperfected.9

Although this Article says very little that is novel about the last event
test and section 9-103 in relation to the initial choice of filing location,
both will be considered and relied upon to support the argument for
perfection by changed circumstances.
After the secured party resolves the "which state" question by applying section 9-103, he must determine the proper office or offices
within the state in which to file the financing statement. Section 9401 ( l) offers each adopting state the choice of three alternative provisions that fix the place to file. 10 Depending on the provision a state
adopts, the answer to the "where in the state" question could depend
on the debtor's place of residence or business, the location of the collateral, or the use of the collateral. 11
Once the secured party determines the proper office or offices in
which to file, he must clear one further hurdle to ensure an effective
filing. The financing statement must meet the sufficiency requirements
of U.C.C. section 9-402(1), which states that a financing statement is
sufficient if it gives:
the names of the debtor and the secured party, is signed by the
debtor, gives an address of the secured party from which information
concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or
describing the items, of collateral. 12
Nine of the UCC, 7 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 641, 666-76 (1976) (examining U.C.C. § 9-103 and associated interpretation problems); Adams, The 1972 Official Text of the Un!form Commercial Code:
Analysis of Conflict of Laws Provision, 45 Miss. L.J. 281, 315-63 (1974) (analyzing the effect of
Mississippi law if the U.C.C. (1972) were adopted in that state).
8. For an overview of the last event test, see infra text accompanying notes 78-100.
9. u.c.c. § 9-103(l)(b).
10. The first choice provides almost exclusively for a single central filing. U.C.C. § 9-401
(First Alternative Subsec. (1)). Under the second option, central filing is again the basic rule, but
unlike the first, a local filing is required if the collateral is farm related or consumer goods. U.C.C.
§ 9-401 (Second Alternative Subsec. (1)). The third option is identical to the second but requires a
local filing in addition to a central filing when a debtor is doing business in only one county of the
state or if the debtor has no place of business within the state but resides in the state. U.C.C. § 9401 (Third Alternative Subsec. (1)).
11. See supra note 10.
12. U.C.C. § 9-402(1). Note, however, that "[a] financing statement substantially complying
with the requirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor errors which are
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Typically, the filing is effective and remains effective until thesecured obligation has been satisfied. 13 The term "effective" indicates the
filing immediately perfects a pre-existing security interest or it perfects
the security interest immediately upon attachment. 14 This Article is not
concerned with effective filings, however, but rather with ineffective
ones. For purposes of this Article, an ineffective filing is one that does
not seriously misleading." U.C.C. § 9-402(8). Thus, only minor deviations from the norm of§ 9·
402 are permitted. See, e.g., In re Smith, 508 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (5th Cir. 1975) (incomplete street
address of debtor sufficient); Jn re Wilco Forest Mach., Inc., 491 F.2d 1041, 1045 (5th Cir. 1974)
(use of a corporate name which no longer designated a separate corporate entity sufficient); Mid·
Eastern Elecs., Inc. v. First Nat'! Bank of S. Md., 455 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1970) (mistake in
date of maturity of a debt obligation sufficient); Citizens Bank v. Ansley, 467 F. Supp. 5 I, 53-55
(D. Ga. 1979) (use of "Ansley Farms" instead of debtor's true name, "E. Ansley,'' insufficient); In
re Hammous, 438 F. Supp. 1143, 1153-54 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (signature ofonly one of two partners
sufficient); In re Bosson, 432 F. Supp. 1013, 1015-18 (C.D. Conn. 1977) (financing statement suffi·
cient when only husband signs even though title is in wife's name; however, security interest de·
fective on other grounds); In re Reeco Elec. Co., 415 F. Supp. 238 passim (S.D. Me. 1976) (absence
of debtor's corporate suffixes sufficient); In re Southern Supply Co. of Greenville, N.C., 405 F.
Supp. 20, 22 (E.D. N.C. 1975) (fact that debtor named only as "Southern Supply Co.'' sufficient);
Jn re Hollis, 301 F. Supp. I, 2-4 (C.D. Conn. 1969) (date of lien noted in security agreement, but
not on form, sufficient); In re Cushman Bakery, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 897, 902-04 (D.
Me. 1975) (disclosure of only the nominee or agent of principal creditor sufficient); In re Eichler, 9
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1406, 1406-07 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (use of informal trade name of
debtor insufficient); In re Modern Eng'g & Tool, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 580, 587-89
(Bankr. C.D. Conn. 1978) (use of term "inventory" to describe listed equipment sufficient); In re
Skinner, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1286, 1287-92 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1977) (addition of
debtor's trade name following his real name sufficient); Jn re James Well Enters., Inc., 21 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 900, 901-03 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1977) (insufficient to identify debtor by
trade name instead of real name); In re Wayne's Olive Knoll Farms, Inc., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1210, 1210-12 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1976) (continuation statement filed after statutory
time period insufficieut); In re Raymond F. Sargent, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 583
passim (Banke. C.D. Me. 1974) (absence of debtor's name insufficient); In re Brawn, 7 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 565, 578 (Bankr. Ref. C.D. Me. 1970) (error in mailing address of debtor
insufficient); Jn re Bennett, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 994, 996 (Bankr. Ref. W.D. Mich.
1969) (security agreement filed as a financing statement sufficient); In re Carlstrom, 3 U.C.C Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 766, 772 (Bankr. Ref. C.D. Me. 1966) (absence of secured party's signature
insufficient); Jn re First State Bank of Nora Springs, Iowa, 183 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1971)
(wrong county used in describing location of real estate on which the items the financing state·
ment covers sufficient); Southwest Bank of Omaha v. Moritz, 203 Neb. 45, 54, 277 N.W.2d 430,
435 (1979) (absence of collateral owner's signature insufficient); Roberts v. International Harvester
Credit Corp., 143 Ga. App. 206, 207, 237 S.E.2d 697, 698 (1977) (one word omission from lender's
name sufficient); Samuel Breiter & Co. v. Domler Leasing Corp., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla·
ghan) 1248, 1249-50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (incorrect serial number of collateral sufficient).
13. U.C.C. § 9-403(2). The filing's effectiveness, however, is limited to a period of five years
from the date of filing unless a continuation statement is filed within six months prior to the
expiration of that period. Id.
14. It is quite possible that when the filing occurs the security interest will not have attached.
Such an order of events is expressly sanctioned by the U.C.C. in that "(a] financing statement may
be filed before a security agreement is made or a security interest otherwise attaches.'' U.C.C. § 9·
402(1). See also U.C.C. § 9-303(1) ("A security interest is perfected when it has attached and
when all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken.'').
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not immediately perfect a pre-existing security interest, one that does
not perfect the security interest immediately upon attachment, or one
that was previously effective, but will no longer perfect the security interest due to a change of circumstances. 15 To narrow the issue still further, this Article is not concerned with the myriad of problems which
inhere in making a determination of effectiveness or the results which
flow from that determination. Instead, this Article focuses on whether
an admittedly ineffective financing statement can be, and should be,
cured 16 by a change in conditions.
II. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PROBLEM
The issue addressed by this Article can best be illustrated by the following hypotheticals:
(1) Buyer enters into an installment contract for the purchase of
a tractor (farm equipment). To secure the purchase price, Seller
reserves a purchase money security interest. At the time of the
purchase and delivery of the tractor, Buyer resides in County A. Nevertheless, Seller files a financing statement in County B because Buyer
represents to Seller his intention to relocate immediately in County B. 17
Buyer subsequently moves to County B, but after a short time moves
back to County A and then to other counties. 18

At the moment of filing, the financing statement was ineffective to
perfect a security interest in favor of the Seller since it was not filed in
the county in which Buyer resided. 19 The filing would have remained
15. An effective filing can become ineffective for a number of reasons. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9103(l)(d) (interstate relocation of collateral); § 9-401 (Alternative Subsec. (3)) ("a change to another county of the debtor's residence or place of business or the location of the collateral, whichever controlled the original filing"); § 9-402(7) (a filing will not perfect a security interest in afteracquired collateral, acquired four months after certain name or organizational changes by the
debtor); 9-403(2) (five year limitation on the effectiveness of an initial filing).
16. The term cure has been used infrequently in this context. See, e.g., DeKoven, Uniform
Commercial Code, Annual Survey: Secured Transacrions, 31 Bus. LAW 1011, 1034-36 (1982) (cure
terminology used in context of changing circumstances and defective financing statement). Cure
is the most accurate and concise term to describe whether subsequent events can validate an ineffective financing statement.
17. A local filing may be required ifthe collateral is farm equipment. U.C.C. §§ 9-401 (Second Alternative Subsec. (1)), (Third Alternative Subsec. (!)).
18. The source of this not so hypothetical hypothetical is International Harvester Credit
Corp. v. Vos, 95 Mich. App. 45, 48-50, 290 N.W.2d 401, 403-04 (1980).
19. See U.C.C. §§ 9-401 (Second Alternative Subsec. (1)), (Third Alternative Subsec. (I))
(under both alternatives the proper place to file to perfect a security interest is in the county of
debtor's residence if the collateral is farm _equipment).
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ineffective if the Buyer continued to reside in County A. 20 The question, then, is whether the subsequent relocation of Buyer to County B
cures the ineffective filing.
Debtor is a corporation with a place of business in only one
county in the state. In need of a vast sum of money, Debtor contacts its
favorite loan officer at the local bank. The loan officer agrees to the
loan if it is secured by a security interest in all of the Debtor's assets.
Debtor agrees and both a security agreement and financing statement
are properly executed. The loan is made and the financing statement is
then filed only with the Secretary of State. Subsequently, Debtor prospers and expands its business throughout the state.21
(2)

Since Debtor was initially doing business in only one county, a
dual filing was required. 22 Had Debtor been doing business in more
than one county, however, only the single filing would have been required.23 Therefore, the singular filing with the Secretary of State was
ineffective to perfect the bank's security interest. This hypothetical is
similar to the previous one, except here the central filing was necessary
but insufficient to perfect the bank's security interest. The question,
once again, is not whether the initial filing was effective but whether a
change in conditions can cure an admittedly ineffective filing. In this
case, the change is the expansion of Debtor's business throughout the
state.
Debtor is a corporation with the name ABC, Inc. It believes
that its profit potential will be realized only by the infusion of additional cash. It contacts its favorite loan officer at the local bank and
requests a loan. The loan officer insists that the loan be secured by a
security interest in all of Debtor's assets. In addition, the loan officer
points out that Debtor has received some negative publicity recently
and suggests that Debtor change its name. Debtor agrees to the security interest and also announces its intention to change its name to XYZ
Co. The loan is made and Debtor executes all the necessary docu(3)

20. Under any test the filing in County B is initially ineffective. See iefra text accompanying
notes 45-54.
21. The source of this not so hypothetical hypothetical is Jn re G. G. Moss Co., rev'd. 3
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 777, ajf'd, No. 81-1818 (4th Cir. 1982). For similar fact patterns,
see Genoa Nat'l Bank v. Sorensen, 208 Neb. 423, 424, 304 N.W.2d 659, 660-61 (1981 ); In re Kane,
1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 582, 583-84 (E.D. Pa. 1962); In re Golden Kernel, Inc. 5 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 43, 44-45 (Bankr. Ref. E.D. Pa. 1968).
22. U.C.C. § 9-401 (Third Alternative Subsec. (l)(c)).
23. Id.
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ments. The loan officer, aware of the imminent name change24 and the
Code-imposed obligation of good faith, 25 designates Debtor in the
financing statement as XYZ Co.26 The financing statement is then filed
in the proper offices. Some time later, Debtor changes its name to XYZ
Co.21

At the time of filing, the financing statement was ineffective and
did not perfect the bank's security interest because Debtor, at the time
of filing, was ABC, Inc., not XYZ Co., and, therefore, Debtor's name
was not given. 28 Subsequently, however, Debtor changed its name to
correspond with the name given in the financing statement. Although
this hypothetical differs from the previous two in that the filing was
originally made in the correct office, it nevertheless raises the identical
issue: whether a change in conditions can cure an admittedly improper
filing.
(4) Debtor, while a resident of State A, grants a bank a security
24. The Old Code did not require the filing of a new financing statement or an amendment if
the identity of the debtor changed and, in general, the courts did not impose such an obligation on
the secured party. E.g., In re GAC, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 412, 413 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1972); In re The Grape Arbor, Inc., 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 632, 633 (Bankr. Ref.
E.D. Pa. 1969); Continental Oil Co. v. Citizens Trust & Savings Bank, 397 Mich. 203, 208, 244
N.W.2d 243, 244 (1976); In re Pasco Sales Co., 77 Misc. 724, 726, 354 N.Y.S.2d 402, 404 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1974). But see In re Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc., 503 F.2d 1218, 1224 (6th Cir. 1974)
(when secured creditor has knowledge of debtor's contemplated name change and does not perfect
filing after name change, the secured creditor forfeits protected interest).
In 1972, subsection (7) was added to U.C.C. § 9-402 which provides, in part:
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organization its name, identity
or corporate structure that a filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading, the
filing is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor
more than four months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing statement is
filed before the expiration of that time.
u.c.c. § 9-402(7).
25. See U.C.C. § 1-203 ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
26. It is not suggested, and the reader should not assume, that the characters in these hypotheticals are practicing co=ercial law well. The fact that those hypotheticals are suggested by
actual cases would attest otherwise.
27. This not so hypothetical hypothetical with some modification is suggested by In re
Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc., 503 F.2d 1218, 1220 (6th Cir. 1974).
28. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (name of debtor essential requirement of any financing statement). The name of the debtor is important because the filing officer is required to index the
financing statement under the debtor's name. U.C.C. § 9-403(4). Although the 1962 version of
U.C.C. § 9-402(1) did not expressly require that the debtor's name be given in the financing statement, courts uniformly held that the debtor's legal name had to appear so the statement could be
filed and indexed in such a manner that a person searching the records under the debtor's legal
name could locate it. E.g., K.N.C. Wholesale, Inc. v. Awmco, Inc., 56 Cal. App. 3d 315, 320, 128
Cal. Rptr. 345, 350 (1976); White Star Distrib., Inc. v. Kennedy, 66 A.D. 2d 1011, 1011, 411 N.Y.S.
2d 751, 752 (1978); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Terra Contractors Corp., 6 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 544, 547 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969).
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interest in certain equipment located in State A. The bank files a
financing statement in the proper office in State A. Debtor then moves
the equipment to State B where it remains for a period of six months.
The bank does not file a financing statement in State B. After the sixmonth period, Debtor returns the equipment to State A. 29
When the financing statement was filed in State A, it was effective,
and perfected the bank's security interest.30 When the collateral was
moved to State B, the bank had four months within which to file a new
financing statement in State B to continue its perfected status. 31 Since
it did not refile, bank's interest became imperfect at the expiration of
the four-month period.32 The question raised by this hypothetical is
whether the relocation of the collateral back into State A reperfected
the bank's security interest and, hence, cured the original filing.
Unlike the previous hypotheticals, the filing here was initially effective, and a change of conditions caused it to become ineffective.
Yet, once the filing is deemed ineffective, the identical issue involving
cure arises; the cure here being the relocation of the collateral back to
State A. The issue does not change merely because the filing was originally effective.
These hypotheticals, by illuminating the problems created by ineffective filings or unperfected security interests, will aid in the following
analysis of cure.
III. THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO CURE
In contrast to the change in conditions in hypotheticals (1) through (3),
the change in hypothetical (4) involved the interstate relocation of the
collateral. For analytical clarity, a discussion of cure by interstate relocation of the collateral will be set out separately from the possibility of
cure resulting from other changes.33 Let us now look at the way the
29. The source of this not so hypothetical hypothetical isln re Miller, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1042, 1042-43 (Bankr. D. Or. 1974). For an excellent discussion of In re Miller, see
Kripke, wpra note 7, at 51-60.
30. See U.C.C. § 9-103(l)(b) ("perfection or non-perfection ofa security interest in collateral
are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is when the last event occurs on
which is based the assenion that the security interest is perfected"). See also infra text accompanying notes 78-88.
31. See U.C.C. § 9-103(l)(d) (perfection continues until expiration of four months after collateral is taken to new states unless earlier refiling is necessitated because perfection would have
ceased by the law of the first jurisdiction).
32. Id.
33. When the change in circumstances involves interstate relocation of collateral, the use of
the last event test is mandated if the collateral is ordinary goods, documents, or instruments.
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courts have resolved or eliminated34 the issue of cure where there has
been an interstate relocation of collateral.
A.

CURE INVOLVING INTERSTATE RELOCATION OF COLLATERAL

In re Miller 35 is the only reported case involving a question of cure by
interstate relocation, although the court did not use the term when
framing the issue. In re Miller involved facts similar to those of the
fourth hypothetical. 36 The debtor, while a resident of California,
granted a security interest in certain equipment to a credit company.
The credit company filed in California. 37 The debtor then moved the
collateral to Oregon and granted a security interest to a lender who
filed in Oregon. The credit company never filed in Oregon where the
collateral remained for more than four months. The collateral was
then returned to California and the lender properly refiled there within
four months. The debtor then went bankrupt.
The court concluded that the credit company's originally perfected
security interest lapsed after the collateral had been in Oregon longer
than four months. Had the collateral remained there the lender's priority would have been unquestioned. 38 The issue, then, was whether return of the equipment to California cured the lapsed filing of the credit
company. The court declared that once a gap occurs, "the original
perfection is not revived." 39
The court concluded that the trustee in bankruptcy took subject to
the lender's security interest but not that of the credit company.40 It is
not clear, however, whether the court believed that the credit comU.C.C. § 9-103(l)(b). When the change in circumstances does not involve interstate relocation of
collateral, other tests have been used. See iefra text accompanying notes 54-66. The test selected
to determine the places at which to file is important because only the last event test will allow for
the recognition of cure. Id.
34. If a court adopts the time of filing or time of attachment test to determine where to file a
financing statement, a financing statement cannot be cured. Hence, courts which have adopted
either test in effect have "eliminated" the issue. See iefra text accompanying notes 67-71.
35. 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1042 (D. Ore. 1974).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
37. The court assumed that the collateral was not customarily used in more than one jurisdiction so that the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral was located governed perfection.
14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1047-48, 1050. The court did state that its "conclusions ...
in the present case would be the same under either [Old Code § 9-103(2)] or [Old Code § 9103(3)]." Id. at 1049. Although the case was decided under the Old Code, it is doubtful the court
would have decided it differently under the U.C.C. Id.
38. Id. at 1043. See Old Code§ 9-103(3) (regarding the need to refile within four months
after interstate relocation of the collateral).
39. Id. at 1046 (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 1047.
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pany's security interest was re-perfected, but subordinated, or remained
unperfected, when the collateral returned to California. Hence, the
only legal proposition for which this case can stand is that, for the purpose of priority, the return of the collateral to the original state of
perfection does not revive the original date of filing. 41 The court could
have reached the identical result had it concluded that the credit company's security interest was re-perfected the moment the collateral was
returned to California, but that for the purpose of a priority contest
with the lender, the credit company's filing was deemed to date from
the time the collateral re-entered California. Thus, the lien of the
lender would continue to have priority.42 The interest of the credit
company could still be subordinate to that of the trustee who would
assert that the cured filing resulted in a voidable preference.43 Only a
finding of re-perfection would be congruent with the recognition of
cure.
B.

CURE NOT INVOLVING INTERSTATE RELOCATION OF
COLLATERAL

In 1981, the issue of cure not involving the interstate relocation of col-

lateral arose in two cases resulting in conflicting decisions. The first
case, originally decided by the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, was In re G. G. Moss Co. ,44 which involved facts similar to those of the second hypothetical. 45 When the secured party first
filed, two filings were required because the debtor had a place of business in only one county within the state.46 The secured party filed both
centrally and locally, but the local filing was made in the wrong county.
After these initial filings, the debtor began a second business in a second county. The secured party then filed an amendment to the central
filing which added collateral.47 Although designated an amendment,
41. Of course, this proposition assumes that the collateral did not return within four months
after its removal. See U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d) (expiration of the period of perfection takes place only
when collateral is brought into and kept in the new state for the specified time).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 122-27.
43. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 60a-b (1970) {applicable sections at time case was decided); Kripke,
supra note 7, at 50 n.15 (the fact that re-perfection occui:red within a few days before bankruptcy
might !Jave allowed preference retention under the Bankruptcy Act).
44. 9 Bankr. 47 (E.D. Va. 1981).
45. See supra text accompanying note 21.
46. Virginia had adopted the Third Alternative Subsection (I) of U.C.C. § 9-401 which requires dual filing when a debtor has only one place of business in the state. VA. CooE § 8.9-401(1)
(1965 added volume).
47. A financing statement may be amended by filing a writing signed by both the debtor and
the secured party. U.C.C. § 9-402(4). It is not clear why a secured party would include additional
collateral by way of an amendment to an original filing instead of simply filing an additional
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this later filing contained all the information required for a financing
statement.48 It is clear, therefore, that: (1) the original filing did not
perfect the security interest because the necessary local filing was not
properly made, and (2) at the time the amendment was filed, only a
central filing was required because the debtor had expanded its business into a second county.49
The bulk of the court's opinion was devoted to th~ issue of
whether the amendment perfected the security interest. The court refused to accept the secured party's argument that the opening of a second place of business made a second filing unnecessary. The secured
party had argued that the status of the initial central filing was elevated
from one which was necessary but insufficient to one which was both
necessary and sufficient to perfect the security interest once the debtor
had expanded his business into a second county. On this latter point,
the court concluded that:
To subscribe to [the secured party's] position would create unintended results. For example, if a company, which had but one location improperly files only at the S.C.C. and not in the county or city
of its business, it would be unperfected. But at the instance that it
opened a second business, which would require filing only at the
S.C.C., [the secured party's] logic would dictate that the security interest would be perfected at that moment. The Code provides otherwise and sound logic would also dictate otherwise .50

The court never specified the applicable Code provision or explained
why sound logic would dictate otherwise. The court concluded that the
security interest was unperfected because an amendment "relates back
to the original financing statement and cannot perfect a security interest if the original was defective." 51 The court's view rested solely on
the theory that an amendment cannot perfect a security interest.52
financing statement. An amendment will not extend the period of effectiveness of the original
filing. Id. Thus, the initial period of perfection as to the new collateral will be less than five years.
See U.C.C. § 9403(2) (''The effectiveness of a filed financing statement lapses on the expiration of
the five year period unless a continuation statement is filed prior to the lapse."). If an additional
financing statement is filed instead, the initial period of perfection will be five years. Id. For
purposes of priority, it makes no difference whether an amendment or a new financing statement
is filed. See U.C.C. § 9402(4) (in Article 9 "the term 'financing statement' means the original
financing statement and any amendments").
48. 9 Bankr. at 50.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
51. Id.
52. The Moss court so interpreted the last sentence of U.C.C. § 9402(4) which reads: "In
this Article, unless the context otherwise requires, the term 'financing statement' means the
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The second case addressing the issue of cure was Genoa National
Bank v. Sorensen ,53 which involved a secured party who originally took
a security interest in growing crops. Although collateral of unharvested
crops required a filing with the Public Service Commission, 54 the secured party failed to file with the Commission. The secured party did
file, however, in the office of the county clerk, a filing which alone
would have been sufficient if the collateral had been harvested by the
debtor. 55 The issue, as in Moss, was whether the local filing, originally
ineffective, became effective after the crops were harvested, thus
perfecting the security interest at that time.
In holding that the security interest had been perfected, the Sorensen court relied on the fact that a financing statement may be filed
before a security interest attaches,56 stating:
We therefore believe the better rule, and the one supported both by
the language of the Uniform Commercial Code and logic, requires us
to hold that if an otherwise unperfected lien is not filed at all the
proper places at the time of filing, but through the passage of time or
change in character of the property becomes a proper filing under the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the lien also becomes
properly perfected and has superior rights over all other liens not
otherwise perfected prior to the time that the previous security lien
was perfected.57
original financing statement and any amendments." Although an amendment can serve many
purposes it cannot act as a financing statement. Had the court adopted the secured party's position, however, this issue would have been moot.
53. 208 Neb. 423, 304 N.W.2d 659 (1981). Disagreeing with only this portion of the court's
opinion, the decision was subsequently reversed by the district court and the reversal affirmed by
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals "for the reasons sufficiently stated in the district court's opinion." 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 777 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981), efd, No. 81-1818 (4th Cir.
1982). The district court had reasoned that
[t]here is no question that but for the fact that it was labeled as an "amendment," appellant's 1976 filing fulfilled both the letter and spirit of Virginia's filing laws. Virginia is a
notice filing state. . . . Appellant's 1976 filing gives adequate notice of its interest in the
debtor's inventory. Its designation as an amendment is not seriously misleading in this
context. Even more importantly, however, when considered by itself the filing also meets
all the technical statutory requirements of a filing statement.
Id. at 779.
54. NER. REV. STAT. § 9-40l(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978). This is no longer the law in Nebraska.
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-40l(l)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
55. 208 Neb. 423, 425-26, 304 N.W.2d 659, 661.
56. u.c.c. § 9-402(1).
57. 208 Neb. at 428-29, 304 N.W.2d at 663. In support of its ruling, the court theorized that
the security interest first attached to the crops when they were harvested; the filing was simply
made before the time of attachment. 208 Neb. at 428-29, 304 N.W.2d at 662-63. This reasoning
appears to be convoluted and has been criticized by one commentator who states that:
In the court's view, the security interest attached to the crops at the time they were harvested and the earlier filing perfected the security interest at that time. However, it
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Hence, the Nebraska Supreme Court, unlike the Moss court, is of the
opinion that an initially ineffective financing statement can be cured by
a subsequent change in circumstances, at least where such change involves a change in the character of the collateral.
Prior to the Moss and Sorensen decisions, two other courts explicitly ruled on the possibility of cure when there is a change in circumstances. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Vos 58 involved facts
identical to those of the first hypothetical,59 where the secured party
filed in a county other than where the debtor resided. The debtor subsequently moved to the county where the filing was made. The trial
court held that the security interest became perfected when the debtor
relocated to the county in which the ineffective filing had been made.
It reasoned that upon relocation there was "a 'unity' of the requisites of
perfection, i.e., a security agreement, attachment and filing in the
county of the debtor's residence, which 'cured' the misfiled financing
statement and perfected plainti.ff s security interest." 60
The Michigan Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court's decision, concluded that "the county of the debtor's residence is the proper
place for filing the financing statement, and should be determined at a
specific moment in time." 61 The court then ruled that the specific moment in time at which the debtor's residence must be determined is the
moment the security interest first attaches. 62 In response to the trial
would seem preferable to view the security interest as attaching at the time the agreement was made, value was given, and the debtor had rights in the collateral, with subsequent perfection at the time the crops were harvested and the filing became ap_propriate
to perfect an interest in them. Moreover, while the court raised no question as to
whether the collateral was properly described and the exact descriptions in the security
agreement and financing were not quoted, the court stated that "crops growing on land
leased by" the debtor were collateral, which perhaps should have raised an issue as to
whether harvested crops were included in the description, although harvested crops
might ar~uably be proceeds of growing crops under § 9-306(1). Under § 9-306(1) die
problem 1s whether stored crops are "proceeds" of "growing crops" within the statutory
language of"whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition
of collateral or proceeds."
DeKoven, U.CC Survey: Secured Transaction, 37 Bus. LAW. 1034, 1036 n. 131 (1982). Hence,
"[t)he problem may not have been as simple as the court reported." Id.
Perhaps the court felt constrained to reason as it did. The court may have felt obligated to
subscribe to the view that a determination of where to file is to be made at the time the security
interest attaches. If this is true, then only by extending the point in time at which the interest
attached could the court hold that the security interest was perfected. See i'!fi-a text accompanying
notes 67-72.
58. 95 Mich. App. 45, 290 N.W.2d 401 (1980).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
60. 95 Mich. App. at 50, 290 N.W.2d at 403.
61. Id. at 53, 290 N.W.2d at 405.
62. Id. at 58, 290 N.W.2d at 408.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1247

1260

court's ''unity of factors" approach, the appellate court stated:
By upholding plaintiffs priority of lien under a "unity of factors"
analysis, the trial court holding perpetuates and encourages a business practice which needlessly complicates, confuses, and impedes
the law governing commercial transactions. To condition the perfection of a security interest upon the debtor's eventual residence in the
county of filing results not in a floating lien, as contemplated by the
UCC, but in a lien" 'drifting' in aimless and hazardous disregard of
the rights of others necessarily navigating the same lanes of
commerce. " 63

Another case dealing expressly with the possibility of cure is In re
Kane .64 The facts are similar to those in Moss except that no amendment was filed. As in International Harvester, the Kane court concluded that "the filing requirements for perfection of the security
interest were to be determined as of the time when the security interest
attached . . . ." 65 The court rejected the secured party's argument that
when the debtors opened other places of business, the formerly insufficient filing became sufficient, concluding that "[p]erfection could not
be made to depend upon what the debtor subsequently does." 66
The U.C.C. does not state when the place of filing is to be determined. A resolution of this issue is necessary whenever there has been
a change of circumstances between the time the security interest first
attaches and the time of filing. Though related to the issue of cure, the
two issues are not identical. The issue of cure necessarily presupposes a
filing which is initially ineffective. The issue of when the relevant factors are determined for purposes of filing controls whether the initial
filing is effective and, hence, whether the issue of cure can ever arise.
The two issues are similar in that the test adopted by a court for determining initial effectiveness will ordinarily provide an answer to the
question of cure.
C.

THREE TESTS FOR WHERE TO FILE AND THEIR
EFFECT ON CURE

The courts have used three different tests to determine the proper location to file a financing statement. Some courts have used the "time of
attachment" test. Under this test the facts existing at the time the se63. Id. at 52-53, 290 N.W.2d at 404-05 (citing In re Pelletier, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 327, 335 (D. Me. 1968)).
64. I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 582 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
65. I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 587.
66. Id.
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curity interest first attaches control the place of filing. 67 For example, if
the debtor resides in County A at the time the security interest first
attaches, a filing would be proper in that county regardless of the
debtor's place of residence at the time of filing. 68 Kane and International Harvester demonstrate that the time of attachment test69 precludes the possibility of later cure because the proper place to file is
determined at a particular moment in time and that place will not
change regardless of later events.
Other courts have opted for a "time of filing" test.70 Under this
test, a creditor can safely ignore the facts existing at the time the security interest first attaches and focus entirely on the facts existing when
the filing is contemplated. For example, if the security interest first attaches when the debtor resides in County A, but if before a filing is
made the debtor relocates to County B, the time of filing test would
require a filing in County B.71 The application of this test also precludes the possibility of cure because the proper place to file is again
determined at a particular moment in time, 1:e., the time of filing.
Whatever occurs subsequent to the filing is irrelevant when making a
determination of the filing's effectiveness.
A third test, the "last event" test, dictates that the proper place to
file is determined by the facts existing when the last event occurs upon
which the perfection of the security interest is based. The use of the
last event test is suggested by a comment to the U.C.C.:
lf the Third Alternative subsection (I) is adopted, then local
filing, in addition to the central filing, is required in all the cases
67. See In re O'Donnell, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 888, 892 (D. Me. 1970) (security
interest perfected by filing in municipality of debtor's residence at the time the security interest
attached, notwithstanding debtor's relocation); In re Pelletier, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
327, 331 (D. Me. 1968) (requiring financing statement to be filed in municipality of debtor's permanent residence as of the date the security interest attaches); In re Kane, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 582, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (filing in wrong county does not perfect security interest even
if debtor later does business there, because filing requirements are determined as of the time when
the security interest attaches to the collateral).
68. For numerous examples of the applications of the time of attachment rule, see generally
Wallach, Perfecting and Reperfecting Security Interests Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30
Bus. LAW. 447, 450-51 (1975).
69. For a brief application of the thne of attachment test (location of filing place determined
as of the time the security interest attaches), see Wallach, supra note 68, at 451-52.
70. In re Page, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 250, 252 (W.D. Ky. 1968). See In re Golden
Kernel, Inc., 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 43, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (single filing insufficient when
debtor consolidated his place of business from two counties to one county between the time debtor
ordered equipment and the time secured party filed).
71. See Wallach, supra note 68, at 450-53 (illustrating use of time of filing test).
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stated in the preceding paragraph, with respect to any debtor whose
places of business within the state are all within a single county
(township, etc.) or a debtor who is not engaged in business. The last
event test stated in Section 9-JOJ(l)(b) and Comment thereto applies to
determine whether localfiling is required under the present section, as
well as to determine in which stale filing is required. 72

If read literally, the comment calls for the application of the last event

test only to determine, under the Third Alternative Subsection (1) of
section 9-401, whether a local filing is required in addition to a central
filing.73
Although the comment does not suggest use of the last event test to
determine where in the state the original filing should be made, one
court has done so. In the case of In re Hammons 74 the security interest
did not become perfected until the secured party gave value to the
debtor and the debtor :ti.ad rights in the collateral, both of which occurred when the secured party delivered part of the merchandise
financed under the security agreement. At the time of delivery, the
debtor was doing business in a different county from the county in
which the financing statement had been filed. The Fifth Circuit corM
reedy concluded that the issue was "at what time in the course of his
dealings with a singleMplaceMofMbusiness debtor the creditor must deterM
mine the proper county in which to make his local filing." 75 The court
rejected both the time of filing and time of attachment tests in favor of
the last event test and held that the security interest was unperfected
because the security party had failed to file in the county where the
debtor was doing business when the last event, the delivery of merM
chandise, occurred. Because there was no indication that the debtor
ever had places of business in two counties at any one time, 76 it is clear
that the last event test determined the filing location within the state.
Unlike the time of filing or time of attachment tests, the adoption
of the last event test to determine where initially to file leads a court to
the inescapable conclusion that an ineffective filing can be cured by a
72. U.C.C. § 9-401, Comment 4 (emphasis added). See Wallach, supra note 68, at 453.54
(describing the history of Comment 4).
73. For a discussion of the application and history of U.C.C. Comments, see Greenberg,
Spec!ftc Performance Under Section 2-716 Of The Uniform Commercial Code: "A More Liberal
Attitude" in the "Grand Style", 17 NEW ENG. 321, 327-28 (1982).
74. 614 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1980).
75. Id. at 404.
76. Id. at 403 n.2.
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change in circumstances.77 Since the test adopted to determine initial
effectiveness of the filing will resolve the issue of cure, it is necessary to
focus on (1) the benefits, if any, of permitting a financing statement to
be cured, and (2) which of the three foregoing tests is best suited to
serving the purpose of the U.C.C. filing system, keeping in mind that
the answer to this question will necessarily resolve the issue of cure.
IV. RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
A.

PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF THE LAST EVENT TEST

Collateral that is subject to the last event test of U.C.C. section
9-103(l)(b) is tangible collateral with a relatively permanent situs.78
Thus, it made perfect sense to adopt a conflict-of-laws rule that provides that perfection and the effect of perfection be governed by the law
of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located.79 On its face, such
a rule seems simple enough. All the secured party must do is determine
where the collateral is located and then comply with that jurisdiction's
perfection requirements. Such a rule, though simple, is not satisfactory; the various types of collateral covered by section 9-103(1) have a
relatively fixed location, but are nevertheless capable of movement.
The following hypothetical illustrates the problem:
(5) Both Debtor and Secured Party are located in New York. A
security agreement is executed and a financing statement is filed in
New York covering Debtor's inventory of furs. Debtor then moves the
furs to California. After the furs arrive in California, Secured Party
then makes the secured loan to Debtor.
This hypothetical illustrates that it is not enough to simply tell a
secured party that he must comply with the perfection requirements of
the state in which the collateral is located. During the period when the
security interest was being created, the collateral was located first in
New York and then in California. A secured party needs a rule that
tells him whether, in such a case, a filing is required in New York,
California, or in both states. Section 9-103(l)(b) addresses this need by
combining a temporal test with a location test. The secured party is
told at what point in time the location of the collateral is to be deter77. For a discussion of the last event test and its application to cure, see iefra notes 78-81
and accompanying text.
78. U.C.C. § 9-103(1). Ordinary goods are those goods "other than those covered by acertificate of title described in subsection (2), mobile goods described in subsection (3), and minerals
described in subsection (5).'' U.C.C. § 9-l03(l)(a).
79. u.c.c. § 9-l03(l)(b).
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mined. Location is to be determined when "the last event occurs on
which is based the assertion that the security interest is perfected or
unperfected." 80
As applied to the foregoing hypothetical, the last event test poses
little difficulty. Before a security interest is perfected, the following
four events must occur: 81
(1) the collateral must be in the possession of the secured party pursuant to a pledge agreement, or the debtor must have signed a security agreement, 82
(2) value must have been given by the secured party, 83
(3) the debtor must have rights in the collateral, 84 and
(4) the collateral must be in the possession of the secured party85 or
the secured party must have filed a financing statement. 86

In the hypothetical, the last of these four events to occur was the giving
of value by the secured party. When this event occurred the collateral
was located in California, so its law governed perfection. Since the
secured party did not possess the collateral, a financing statement had
to be filed in California. No statement was filed, so the secured party's
interest was unperfected.
The application of the last event test to this hypothetical was simple because the relevant last event was clearly one of the affirmative
four steps necessary for perfection. 87 What is not so clear, however, is
whether the relevant last event can be an event other than the four
above. 88 Only if it can will an ineffective financing statement be cured
by a change in conditions.
To illustrate the potential ambiguity of the last event test, Mr. Peter Coogan posits the following hypothetical:
80. Id.
81. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1) ("A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when
all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken.").
82. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a).
§ 9-203(1)(b).
83.
84. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c).
85.
§ 9-305.
86.
§ 9-302(1).
87. R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-5
(1973); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 968 (1980).
88. See Coogan, supra note 7, at 539-42 (discussion of last event test ambiguities); Kripke,
supra note 7, at 61-62 (discussing "misapprehensions" about last event test); R. HENSON, supra
note 87, at 330 (last event language labeled "infelicitous"); Wallach, supra note 68, at 62-63 (noting conflict between last event test and U.C.C. § 9-401(3)). Haydock, Book Review, 21 WAYNE L.
REv. 183, 187-89 (1974) (disagreeing with U.C.C. definition of "event").

u.c.c.

u.c.c.
u.c.c.
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(6) D and S, both located in Pennsylvania, execute a security
agreement covering D's inventory, including after-acquired items. S
makes a large advance and files a financing statement in Pennsylvania. . . . Suppose certain after-acquired inventory is to be
shipped from California and the debtor acquires rights in those goods
while they are still in California. 89 Mr. Coogan correctly asserts that:
S's filing in Pennsylvania would not protect him before the goods
arrive there. The last event on which S would have to base his assertion that he had a perfected security interest in the goods before their
entry into Pennsylvania would be D's acquisition of rights in the collateral. But since the goods were not located in Pennsylvania when
this event occurred, paragraph (l)(b) tells us that Pennsylvania law
did not at the time of this event govern perfection, and that, therefore, the Pennsylvania filing is ineffective.90

Mr. Coogan's concern is the status of S's security interest once the
goods arrive in Pennsylvania. He believes a literal reading of section 9103( l){b) supports the following argument:
[S]ince no "last event" has occurred prior to the entry of the goods
into Pennsylvania on which could be based a valid assertion that S's
security interest is perfected, a "last event"-presumably another
filing-will have to occur after the goods arrive in order for perfection in Pennsylvania to be good. Since the collateral would be located in Pennsylvania when this "last event" occurred, the second
Pennsylvania filing would be effective. Were the original filing in
Pennsylvania to become effective upon the collateral's arrival there,
it could be argued, paragraph 9-103(l)(b) would essentially be making the movement of goods into a jurisdiction a sixth step of perfection-a step not listed in 9-303.91

This argument assumes that the last event must be one of the statutory
events required for perfection. Since one of the statutory events necessary for attachment cannot reoccur once the goods arrive in Pennsylvania and a statutory event is necessary, the secured party will have
to create such an event by filing. 92
89. Coogan, supra note 7, at 539. Though the debtor had not received possession of the
goods, it is still possible that upon contracting for sale the debtor acquired rights in the collateral
because a buyer obtains a "special property and an insurable interest" in goods by identification
of existing goods to a contract of sale. U.C.C. § 2-501(1).
90. Coogan, supra note 7, at 539.
91. Coogan, supra note 7, at 541 (emphasis in original).
92. Mr. Coogan suggests that this problem could be avoided if the parties provide in their
security agreement that the security interest not attach until arrival of the goods in Pennsylvania
pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-203(2). Id. at 543. Mr. Haydock, in my opinion, correctly refutes this
position by pointing out that it will not work "because even though the parties agree to delay
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If such an argument were successful then an ineffective financing
statement could never be cured. When the debtor in the foregoing hypothetical acquired rights in the after-acquired collateral, the secured
party's security interest attached to those goods. At that moment, the
Pennsylvania filing was ineffective to perfect the security interest. Unless the movement of the collateral into Pennsylvania constitutes a last
event, cure is impossible and, as Mr. Coogan points out, a new filing
would be necessary in Pennsylvania. It is only when the last event for
purposes of section 9-103(1)(b) is interpreted as any event, which would
result in the financing statement being effective if then filed, that cure
becomes possible.

To limit the last event to one of the statutory events required for
perfection is "patently absurd." 93 According to Professor Kripke such
an interpretation
ignores the drafting style of the Code. Had it been the intention to
limit the category of "last events" to the affirmative five steps required to perfect a security interest, cross-references to the relevant
sections would have been made and the same terminology used. But
this, of course, was not done. 94
Happily, even Mr. Coogan believes that "[s]uch a result could not have
been intended by the draftsmen and is not dictated by the logic of Article 9." 95
'Apart from the fact that the literal wording of the U.C.C. does not
support such an interpretation, limiting the permissible last event
would be nonsensical. First, to require a second filing after the goods
enter Pennsylvania would serve no useful purpose whatsoever. Second,
such an interpretation would contradict the mandate of the U.C.C. that
it be interpreted to "simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions." 96 The secured party, in Mr. Coogan's hypothetical, would constantly have to monitor the debtor's acquisition of
goods and determine at what point the debtor acquired rights in goods.
If the debtor first acquired rights in after-acquired goods before their
entry into Pennsylvania, then the secured party would have to file
again in Pennsylvania after their entry. Such a requirement would
attachment until the property is moved into state A, the four events necessary for perfection would
have in fact occurred." Haydock, supra note 88, at 188.
93. Haydock, supra note 88, at 188; Kripke, supra note 7, at 63.
94. Kripke, supra note 7, at 61.
95. Coogan, supra note 7, at 541.
96. u.c.c. § 1-102.
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place an intolerable burden upon the secured party. Ultimately this
would limit the use of inventory as collateral.
To further illustrate that the last event should not be so limited
and that a financing statement should be able to be cured in cases involving interstate movement, consider the following hypothetical:
(7) Debtor is a national retail chain with stores in all fifty states.
Secured Party has a security interest in Debtor's inventory. To perfect
its security interest, Secured Party files in all fifty states. Assume that
Debtor's store in Pennsylvania runs out of televisions. Debtor then
moves some televisions from its Delaware store or perhaps a warehouse
in Delaware to the Pennsylvania store.
Since Secured Party had filed in Delaware one can assume that it
had a perfected security interest in the televisions before removal to
Pennsylvania.97 It is also clear that before removal to Pennsylvania,
the Pennsylvania filing was ineffective to perfect a security interest in
the Delaware televisions.98 The question, then, is what happens to Secured Party's perfected security interest once the televisions are removed to Pennsylvania.
If the relevant last event is an event other than movement of the
televisions into Pennsylvania, perfection will lapse four months after
arrival unless Secured Party files a new financing statement in Pennsylvania before expiration of that period. 99 Since the Secured Party
will probably be unaware of this transaction, it will not file and its perfected security interest in these televisions will lapse after four months.
If, on the other hand, the movement of the televisions is considered the
last event, the televisions will be located in Pennsylvania when that
event occurs. Hence, the law of Pennsylvania will apply. Since Secured Party has filed in Pennsylvania, it will have a perfected security
interest in the televisions the moment they enter Pennsylvania which
will not lapse after four months. As to these televisions, the ineffective
Pennsylvania filing will be cured by the change in circumstances, i.e.,
the movement of the televisions into Pennsylvania. Unless this latter
interpretation is accepted, a secured party will always run the risk that
its perfected security interest in inventory will be lost by interstate shuffling of goods by the debtor. Such a result seriously impedes the use of
inventory as collateral.
97. See U.C.C. § 9-103 (perfection of security interest in multiple state transactions).
98. Id.
99. u.c.c. § 9-103(l)(d).
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A restrictive view of the last event test penalizes a secured party
who anticipates a change in the collateral's location and files accordingly. For example, if a debtor notifies the secured party that the collateral will be relocated to another state, the filing in the new state will
have to await the collateral's arrival. Filing in the new state before the
collateral's arrival would result in the problems raised by the previous
two hypotheticals. The secured party would be required to constantly
monitor the collateral or risk reliance on the debtor's representation to
determine if and when the collateral is relocated. If, however, the last
event can be the relocation of the collateral, then pre-filing would be
feasible. The pre-filed financing statement, initially ineffective, would
be cured by the relocation of the collateral which becomes the last
event. It is this view that permits an ineffective filing to be cured by
interstate relocation; it is doubtful if any other view of the last event
test can be justified.
As discussed previously, three tests exist for the purpose of establishing the time at which the secured party must determine the proper
place to file under section 9-401(1): the time of filing test, the time of
attachment test, and the last event test. 100 But only the last event test is
flexible enough to permit cure and then only if the relevant last event
can be an event other than one of the statutory events required for
perfection. The last event test is used to determine the proper state in
which to file pursuant to section 9-103(l)(b). There is no reason to
limit the permissible last event when the test is used to determine where
in a state to file pursuant to section 9-401(1).
B.

AVAILABLE TESTS AND FILING PURPOSES

Because only the last event test permits cure, arguments critical of its
use must be examined. Nonapplication of the last event test would be
justified if it failed to serve the purpose of filing 101 or unduly burdened
the secured party. 102
100. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77.
10 I. The accepted purpose of filing is to enable a third pany to obtain information concern·
ing interests created by the debtor. See U.C.C. § 9-401, Official Comment 3 ("The policy of the
subsection is to require filing in the place or places where a creditor would normally look for
information concerning interests created by the debtor.").
102. See Kripke, supra note 7, at 63-65 (convenience of the secured pany in determining
where to file was an imponant consideration in drafting the U.C.C.).
Although the secured party's convenience is an imponant criterion, it should not necessarily
mandate a panicular rule when countervailing considerations exist, as recognized by Professor
Wallach who states:
[T]he last event test may compel the secured pany to contact the debtor or otherwise
determine the facts when he would not otherwise have had to do so. The slightly in-
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In Hammons the court believed that:
By requiring that the determination of the proper place to file be
made at the time when the last event occurs upon which the perfection of the creditor's security interest is based, the last event rule ensures that the place in which the filing is made and the contents of
the filing will reflect any changes made by the debtor between the
time of attachment and the time of filing, regardless of which came
first. The filing would be more likely to reflect the location and status of the debtor which exists at the time a subsequent creditor is
searching the records to determine what prior security interests have
been perfected against the debtor and therefore will be more likely to
be found by such a subsequent creditor. 103

This view has been adopted by Professor Wallach who states that, "The
test best suited to serving the purpose of filing is a last event test or last
to occur test . . . ." 104 Though the "last event" test is perhaps the best
of the three tests, its real value arises only when the issue of cure is
considered.

It is suggested that for the purpose of giving notice to a third party,
it matters little which test is adopted. For example, assume that in order to perfect its security interest the secured party must file in County
A, the county of the debtor's residence. The security interest attaches
when the debtor resides in County A. The debtor subsequently moves
to County B. The time of attachment rule would require that a filing
be made in County A. Since it would be impossible for a prospective
creditor to determine the debtor's residence at the time a security interest may have attached, to be safe the creditor must search the records of
each county in which the debtor lived during the life of the collateral.
The potential unreliability of a debtor's representation regarding residency requires that the creditor check the records of every county
within the state.
Similarly, an extensive search also would be required if the time of
filing test were adopted. Since the U.C.C. permits a secured party to
file prior to attachment, 105 a filing would be proper under this test if
made in the county of the debtor's residence regardless of whether,
before the security interest attaches, the debtor acquires a residence in a
creased burden this requirement places on the secured party is justified by the greater
likelihood that subsequent parties will discover the financing statement during their
search of the files.
Wallach, supra note 68, at 453.
103. 614 F.2d at 405 (footnote omitted).
104. Wallach, supra note 68, at 453.
105. u.c.c. §§ 9-402(1), -303.
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different county. A prospective creditor, again unwilling to rely on the
debtor's representation regarding residency, would have to check the
records of every county within the state.
The burden on the prospective creditor is not significantly lessened
by adoption of the last event test. Though it is true that the filing will
reflect any change in debtor's residency between the time of attachme~t
and the time of filing, the prospective creditor cannot determine where
the debtor resided when the last event occurred. So, once again, a
search of the records of every county is necessary.
In determining which test best reduces the filing burden on the
secured party, it is interesting to note that essentially the same argument has been advanced in favor of both the time of filing test and time
of attachment test. The argument in favor of adopting the time of filing
test is that a filing should not be rendered ineffective by a change in
circumstances between the time of filing and the subsequent attachment. 106 The argument in favor of the time of attachment test is that
the time the security interest attaches occurs "on the occasion of the
final contact or communication between the parties to the transaction,
thereby affording a final opportunity for careful verification." 107 Each
argument, however, assumes that the transaction between the debtor
and creditor proceeds in a particular order. Unfortunately, this is not
the case. If filing precedes attachment, the time of attachment test requires that the secured party remain alert to changes between filing and
attachment. If attachment precedes filing, the secured party must remain alert to changes between the time of attachment and filing.
Hence, neither the time of filing test nor the time of attachment test is
inherently superior. 108

The burden of alertness imposed upon the secured party by the
time of filing test or the time of attachment test is neither necessarily
reduced nor increased by the last event test. Professor Kripke, arguing
in favor of the time of filing test, states that "the imposition, under a
last event test, of a duty to remain alert after filing to intrastate removals is a burden that cannot be justified." 109 This assumes, however, that
filing precedes attachment. If filing occurs after attachment, the burden
106. W. WILLIER & F. HART, 6G U.C.C. REPORTER-DIGEST 2-1935, 2-1938, 39 (1969).
107. Jn re Pelletier, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 327, 332 (S.D. Me. 1968).
I08. A creditor, however, would be wise to take the necessary steps for perfection, if possible,
before the security interest attaches. The security interest cannot attach until the creditor gives
value; therefore, value should be withheld until the creditor is certain of his priority. See supra
text accompanying notes 81-86.
109. Kripke, supra note 7, at 69.
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on the secured party will remain the same under the time of filing test
or last event test because the time of filing will be the last event. Similarly, the burden on the secured party will be identical regardless of
whether the time of attachment test or the last event test is used unless
attachment precedes filing. If attachment occurs after filing, the moment the security interest attaches will be when the last event occurs.
The last event test, therefore, is identical to the other tests when determining the effect on the secured party's burden of alertness; increases
or decreases in the burden on the secured party depend solely on the
order in which the transaction proceeds. Even if it could be shown that
a burden results from application of the last event test, it is slight. Professor Kripke admits that a change of circumstances, making the filing
ineffective and occurring between the time of filing and the time of
attachment, would be unlikely to occur. 110 Also, any slightly increased
burden is more than justified because only the last event test permits an
ineffective filing to be cured.
C.

BENEFITS OF ALLOWING CURE

A number of benefits are gained by the adoption of a filing rule allowing cure. It has long been a legal axiom that one should not be
required to perform a purposeless act. 111 If cure is not permitted, a
secured party would be required to refile a financing statement for the
sole reason that the first filing was "initially" ineffective. The question
remains whether such a requirement serves any valid purpose.
Perhaps a valid purpose for requiring a second filing can be gathered from the effect of such a rule. First, the secured party, upon refiling, might have a second stamp placed upon the original statement by
once again paying the filing fee. At least one court has recognized that
"such a requirement would be to simply ignore the realities of life and
the intent and purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code." 112 Thesecured party could simply file a new financing statement. 113 Second,
refiling would put any third party on notice that the original filing,
when made, was ineffective. Clearly, no useful reason exists for putting
third parties on notice of this fact. 114 A third possible consequence of
such a rule would be that the secured party, if there is no refiling, re110. Id.
111. See U.C.C. § 3-511, Official Co=ent 7 (excusing presentment, protest, or notice of dishonor of commercial paper when to require it would serve no useful purpose).
112. Genoa Nat'l Bank v. Sorensen, 208 Neb. 423, 428, 304 N.W.2d 659, 662 (1981).
113. Haydock, supra note 88, at 188-89.
114. See id. at 189 ("Obviously, this [third party notice] would serve no useful purpose.").
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mains unperfected. No commercial justification exists, however, for
relegating the secured party to the permanent status of "unperfected."
Since a third party would assume that the original filing was in the
correct office, he would undoubtedly check that office for filings against
the debtor and would discover the secured party's filing. Thus, the
original filing would fulfill the U.C.C. purpose by giving "constructive
notice to the world and actual notice to those who would take the
trouble to look." 115
A rule prohibiting cure, therefore, cannot be justified by its consequences. In fact, the consequences support the argument in favor of
cure since they eliminate the need to perform useless acts that potentially prejudice secured parties.
Other advantages exist for permitting cure. In re Kalamazoo Steel
Process, Inc. , 116 although not a case involving cure, illustrates one of
these benefits. In that case, the secured party knew at the time the security agreement was executed that the debtor intended to change its
name. The financing statement, however, did not reflect the anticipated name change. The court, relying on the U.C.C. imposed duty of
good faith, 117 held that
[w]hen a secured party has knowledge at the time the security agreement is executed that the debtor intends to change its name, and the
new name is known to him, the secured party must act in good faith
to insure that the filing under the Code not only discloses the current
and correct name of the debtor but also reflects the pending name
change of which the parties are aware. 118

To accomplish this, the court suggested that the original financing
statement be drafted to indicate the contemplated name change by including both the debtor's current name and the anticipated name. 119
Implicit in such a suggestion is the court's acceptance of the cure doctrine. If a statement with only the anticipated name were filed, it
clearly would be an ineffective filing because of the absence of the
debtor's actual name, and thus, the financing statement would be seriously misleading. The statement would only become effective and,
hence, cured when the debtor changed its name. The name change
would be the last event. If cure were not recognized in such a case, the
secured party would be required to wait until after the name change to
ll5.
116.
117.
118.
ll9.

Genoa Nat'! Bank v. Sorensen, 208 Neb. 423, 427, 304 N.W.2d 659, 662 (1981).
503 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1974).
u.c.c. § 1-203.
503 F.2d at 1222.
Id. at 1222-23.

1983]

UCC FILINGS

1273

file. Such a requirement would pose serious difficulties for the secured
party, as in the case of interstate relocation of collateral. 120 The secured party would have to constantly monitor the collateral or rely on
the debtor's representation as to when the name change occurs. 121
The problem of an anticipatory refiling also arises in those states
that have adopted the alternative section 9-401(3). 122 Only if cure is
recognized can a secured party safely file in advance of a change that
would necessitate a refiling. Thus, to recognize and allow anticipatory
refiling is the only sensible position.
The problem of cure raised by an anticipatory refiling is not identical to the issue of cure raised in In re G. G. Moss Co. 123 and Sorensen. 124 When the issue arises because of an anticipatory refiling, it is
assumed that the initial filing was originally effective under the test
used by the particular jurisdiction. It is therefore theoretically possible
for a court to adopt the time of filing test or time of attachment test for
initial perfection, but to permit cure of an anticipatory refiling nevertheless, even though the initial filing could never be cured. Such a position, though theoretically possible, is logically inconsistent. It would
be anomalous to hold that an initially improper filing remains ineffective no matter what subsequently occurs, but that an anticipatory refiling, ineffective and not required when made, can nevertheless be cured
and become effective by a subsequent change in conditions. Unless
courts adopt the last event test to determine initial perfection, which
would permit cure, one of two results will follow: first, for logical consistency courts will refuse to recognize and give effect to an anticipatory
120. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
121. This problem can be particularly acute if the secured party intends to claim a security
interest in the property acquired by the debtor after the execution of the security agreement.
U.C.C. § 9-402(7) provides that:
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organization its name, identity
or corporate structure that a filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading, the
filing is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor
more than four months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing statement is
filed before the expiration of that time.
122. U.C.C. § 9-401 (Alternative Subsec. (3)) states that:
A filing which is made in the proper county continues effective for four months after a
change to another county of the debtor's residence or place of business or the location of
the collateral, whichever controlled the original filing. It becomes ineffective thereafter
unless a copy of the financing statement signed by the secured party is filed in the new
county within said period. The security interest may also be perfected in the new county
after the expiration of the four-month period; in such case perfection dates from the time
of perfection in the new county. A change in the use of the collateral does not impair the
effectiveness of the original filing.
123. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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refiling; or, second, courts must abandon all logical consistency and
give effect to anticipatory refiling. Neither of these results is desirable.
D.

JUDICIAL GLOSS

To

PREVENT UNDESIRABLE RESULTS

Although it is urged here that courts adopt the last event test for the
purpose of testing the effectiveness of a financing statement, its application can create a statutory interpretation problem that should be
addressed.
The case of In re Miller is illustrative. 125 If the court had explicitly
ruled that the lapsed filing by the credit company had been cured when
the collateral was returned to California, the priority contest between
the credit company and the lender would be a contest between two
perfected parties. Since both parties' interests were perfected by filing,
priority would be determined pursuant to U.C.C. section 9-312(5)(a). 126
If that section were applied literally the credit company would have
priority since it had originally filed before the lender. 127 Such a result,
however, seems clearly unjust and would certainly come as a surprise
to the lender. If the collateral had remained in Oregon, the lender's
security interest would have had priority since it would have been perfected, whereas the credit company's security interest would have been
unperfected. When the collateral was returned to California, the
lender followed the mandate of the U.C.C. and refiled there. 128 Why,
then, should the lender lose its priority when it did everything required
by the U.C.C. to maintain priority? The answer is that the lender
should not lose its priority. To prevent such a result, section 9-312(5)
must receive a thin coating of judicial gloss. 129
The theory behind the "first to file or perfect" rule of section 9125. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
126. Although Miller was decided under the Old Code§ 9-312(5), the 1972 revisions to that
section would change neither the result nor the analysis which follows.
127. 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1043; U.C.C. § 9-312(5). The credit company had
filed in California prior to April I, 1973 while the goods were located within that state. The lender
filed in Oregon on April 30, 1973 and in California on December JO, 1973.
128. 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1043.
129. Professor Kripke is aware of the limitations ofU.C.C. § 9-312 when there are interstate
complications. He suggests that
the first-to-file rule of revised section 9-312(5)(a) should be limited to filings which have
inunediate territorial effect on the collateral concerned. Otherwise, when the collateral
moves into the territorial reach of a filing, that filing should be deemed to date from the
time of entry, and the filing in the origination state should Jiave the benefit of tile continuous perfection concept.
Kripke, supra note 7, at 59. See also B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE~ 3.8(4] (1980) (illustrating limitations on the first to file rule
when two debtors are involved).
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312(5) is that the second secured party, before making a loan to the
debtor, could have found any prior secured party's competing interest
by checking the public files, or by investigating the reason for the
debtor's lack of possession of the collateral. 130 Whenever a financing
statement is found to be cured, it inevitably follows that the filing was
ineffective prior to the event or events resulting in cure. Regardless of
the basis for the financing statement's ineffectiveness, the fact that it
was ineffective means that it would not put an interested third party on
notice of the prior security interest. Under most circumstances, therefore, an ineffective filing is equivalent to the complete absence of any
filing.13 1 Consequently, an ineffective financing statement should be
treated as if no filing had occurred during its period of ineffectiveness.
A secured party should not be permitted to rely on the date of the ineffective filing for the purpose of establishing priority under section 9312(5). The date of cure, therefore, should be considered to be the date
of filing. This approach, applied to the facts of Miller, would result in
the lender having priority over the credit company. The lender's filing
date would be the date of the Oregon filing which would be continued
by a timely refiling in California. The credit company's filing date
would be the date upon which the collateral was returned to California,
ie., the date of cure.
The courts should apply section 9-312(5) in the manner suggested
because of the inequities that result from a literal application of that
section. Only by using the suggested approach can a court allow for
cure without upsetting the order of priority intended by the U.C.C.'s
drafters.
CONCLUSION
The possibility of an ineffective financing statement being cured by a
subsequent change in conditions depends on the test adopted for determining initial ineffectiveness. Both the time of filing test and the time
of attachment test preclude the opportunity for cure, because both require a determination of effectiveness at a particular point in time. The
last event test, however, if properly interpreted, is flexible enough to
accommodate the concept of cure since the event resulting in cure
would be the last event upon which the perfection of the security interest is based.
This Article demonstrates that if cure is excluded from considera130. B. CLARK, supra note 129, at
131. See supra note 4.
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tion, it matters little which of the three tests a court chooses to adopt.
But when the benefits of permitting cure are considered, the choice of
tests becomes crucial. The last event test should be chosen simply because it allows for cure. Furthermore, by adopting a flexible approach
to the first to file rule of section 9-312(5), cure will not disrupt third
party expectations. Although a number of courts have flirted with the
issue of cure, few were aware of doing so. It is hoped that this Article
will help create such an awareness. 132

132. The U.C.C. only recognizes the concept of "cure" in an entirely different context. See.
e.g., U.C.C. § 2-508 (rejected delivery due to nonconformity may be "cured" with a conforming
delivery).

